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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
H. C. HARGRAVES, Building In-
spector for 8alt Lake City, a 
municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellarnt, 
-vs.-
HARRY L. YOUNG, KENNETH L. 
ANDERSON and WILLIAIVI 
vV ..:\-'-LI(ENHORST, 
Defendants and Resp,onden.t:s. 
Case No. 8275 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO REHEARING 
It seerns that the principal argument which counsel 
for defendants rnade at the original hearing and now 
n1akes relates to his contention that we must decide 
whether the carports in question constitute buildings. 
This rnerely confuses the issue and is not necessary to 
the action of either the District Court or this court. 
There are various statutes throughout the country 
'v hich state in effect that "no building shall be construct-
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ed nearer than X feet to the property line .... " How-
ever, the ordinance with "\vhich "\Ve are involved here is 
patterned after those ordinances which require that side 
and rear yards shall be open and unobstructed. There 
is nothing in the order of the District Court which says 
anything about a building and the District Court and this 
court refer to the carports as structures. All the talk, 
argument and purported citation of authorities which try 
to force us to a determination as to whether these car-
ports are buildings are immaterial and have absolutely 
no bearing on the case. In the instant case we feel that 
the question of a building being involved is completely 
out of the picture and if this is so substantially the entire 
argument made by counsel for defendants fails. 
Counsel for defendants seem worried because the 
decision in this case possibly doesn't decide every ques-
tion that could arise under the zoning laws in the future. 
Of course, we respectfully submit that few court decisions 
do settle for all time every question that can arise in re-
lation to the subject of the decision. 
Counsel for defendants express concern about what 
will happen to clotheslines and ·TV aerials. By analogy 
the answer to that can be found in a statement by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Dtl!JJ-
bright Lighting Comp1any v. Missouri, 72 Sup. Crt. 405, 
where the court stated: 
"Extreme cases are conjured up where an 
employer is required to pay wages for a period 
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that has no relationship to the legi ti1na te end. 
Those cases can await decision as and when they 
arise." 
\V-e think here that the zoning ordinances have 
,,-orked out pretty well and this is perhaps the first case 
of this general nature which has arisen in a great many 
years. It is doubtful if \Ve need to be unduly appre-
hensive about a needless stream of litigation because of 
the decision in this case. Certainly our experience 
doesn't justify such an apprehension. 
Of course, in all such matters a line must be drawn 
so1nevvhere and \Ve think the legislative body not only 
has the authority, but is better equipped than the court 
to say where lines shall be drawn. It would perhaps 
require considerable argument to justify a fine for going 
51 1niles an hour at a given location where everyone was 
perrnitted to go 50 miles an hour with i1npunity at the 
same location. 
Presumably, i_f someone installed a radio antenna in 
an area designated as a sideyard little or no complaint 
would be made and it is doubtful if police action would 
be taken. On the other hand if someone stacked lumber 
20 feet high in the entire area from the house to the 
property line we think there would be action taken on 
the part of the zoning authorities and this in spite of 
the vigorous contention of counsel for defendants that 
such a stack of lumber couldn't possibly constitute a 
building. Thus we see that extreme examples can be 
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given which don't solve all the 1nore refined proble1ns. 
The point is, ho,vever, that 've dra'v a line and the dis-
tance from one inch one side of the line to one inch the 
other side of the line is very narrow and the person who 
is one inch on the "\vrong side feels terribly aggrieved. 
The fact still remains that wherever we project the line 
the distance bet,veen the right side and the wrong side 
"\vill still be only an inch or two. 
As to whether or not we have· questions of p·ublic 
health, safety, rnorals and general welfare, we feel that 
the legislatures with judicial approval, have given legis-
lative bodies considerable power in the field of zoning. 
Since the power does exist there is no justifiable reason 
for striking down legislative action even if there is a 
difference of opinion between the court and the legislative 
body as to whether or not the structures involved in 
this, or any other· action, should be permitted or pro-
hibited. A further statement from the case of Daybrigh.t 
Lighting Company v. Missouri (sup·ra) fairly states the 
proposition in this respect as follows: 
"The judgment of the legislature that time 
out for voting should cost the e1nployee nothing 
may be a debatable one. It is indeed conceded 
by the opposition to be such, but if our recent 
cases mean anything they leave debatable issues 
as respect to business, economic and social affairs 
to legislative decision. We could strike down this 
law only if we return to the philosophy of the 
Lochner, Coppage and Adkins cases." 
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Finally, \Ye might point out that which is axiomatic, 
na1nely that there must be some very excellent reasons 
for the granting of a rehearing. This court in the case 
of Cnnunings v. Nelson at 129 Pac. 619 had this to say 
about rehearings: 
"\V e desire to add a word in conclusion re-
specting the numerous applications for rehearings 
in this court. To make an application for a re-
hearing is a matter of right, and we have no de-
sire to discourage the practice of filing petitions 
for rehearings in proper cases. When this court, 
however, has considered and decided all of the 
1naterial questions involved in a case, a rehearing 
should not be applied for, unless we have mis-
construed or over looked some rna terial fact or 
facts, or have overlooked some statute or decision 
which may affect the result, or that "\Ve have based 
the decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked something 
which materially affects the result. In this case 
nothing was done or attempted by counsel, except 
to reargue the very propositions we had fully 
considered and decided. If we should write opin-
ions on all the petitions for rehearings filed, we 
would have to devote a very large portion of our 
time in answering counsel's contentions a second 
time; and, if we should grant rehearings because 
they are demanded, we should do nothing else 
save to write and rewrite opinions in a few cases. 
Let it again be said that it is conceded, as a matter 
of course, that we cannot convince losing counsel 
that their contentions should not prevail, but in 
making this concession let it also be remembered 
that we, and not counsel, must ultimately assume 
all responsibility with respect to whether our 
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conclusions are sound or unsound. Our endeavor 
is to determine all cases correctly upon the la ". 
and the facts, and, if we fail in this, it is because 
we are incapable of arriving at just conclusions. 
As a general rule, therefore, merely to reargue 
the grounds originally presented can be of little, 
if any, airl to us." 
We ~ee nothing in the present case that qualifies 
it for a rehearing under the require1nents above set forth. 
Thus for the reasons stated herein we feel that the peti-
tion for a rehearing in this matter should be denied. 
· Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENS·EN, HOLMGREN 
& CHRIST.OFFIERSEN 
414 City and County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
.Attorneys for Plaintiff Grnd 
Appellant 
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